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In the Supre1ne Court of the 
State of Utah 
METROPOLITAN \VATER DISTRICT ,. 
OF PROVO CITY, a public corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
PROVO RIVER WATER USERS AS-
SOCIATION, a corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
CASE 
NO. 10,000 
Respondent does not disagree with appellant's general 
statement in this regard. 
DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT 
The trial court found the agreement contended for by 
respondent, and by its judgment gives effect to such agree-
ment. Respondent seeks only an affinnation of the trial 
court's Findings, Conclusion and Judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set forth by appellant are es-
sentially correct, except that we believe they need ampli-
fication in at least four particulars. 
First, on page nine of its brief, appellant says that 
"No contract exists between the respondent District and 
the United States pertaining to this project." This is true, 
but is somewhat misleading because the subscription con-
tract between appellant and respondent dated September 
18, 1937, specifically provides that the payments to be 
made by the respondent District to the appellant Associ-
ation sometime in the future are to be made to the appel-
lant -Association and to the United States jointly. The 
language of that contract was not changed by the Amend-
atory Subscription Contract of February 3, 1947, and 
reads as follows: 
"All monies payable hereunder by the District 
to the Association on acCOWlt of (a) the purchase 
price of tbe stock of the District in the Association, 
and (b) of the default of some other stockholder in 
the payment of the purchase price of the stock of such 
other stockholder in the Association, shall be paid 
by the District to the Association and the United 
States jointly." (Pl. Exh. 4, P. 13). 
Second, on page ten of its brief, appellant admits that 
from 1947 through 1960, a period of 14 years, the audi-
tor's reports on appellant's books show that the $6,000.00, 
together with intere3: aecruals from the investment there-
of, were credited to the stock subscription account of 
respondent. The following language or language of sim-
ilar import appears in the Annual Auditor's Reports on 
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appellant's books made by various accounting finns cov-
ering the years 1947 to 1960, inclusive: (Pl. Exhs. 9, 10, 
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22). 
"Because of debt limitation restrictions, an ad-
vance payment of $6,000.00 was made by the Metro-
politan Water District of Provo City to be held for 
future application on its share of future U. S. con-
tract obligation assessments. The amount advanced 
to the Association has been invested in United States 
Savings Bonds, Series "J". Earnings on these invest-
ments have been credited to the account of the Provo 
Metropolitan Water District." (Pl. E~h. 22). 
Third, on pages nine and ten of appellant's brief, it 
is adn1itted that on March 14, 1947, being about six weeks 
after the execution of the Amendatory Subscription Con-
tract. a motion was passed by the Board of Directors of 
appellant Association providing that the $6,000.00 paid 
to appellant be not mingled with appellant's general funds, 
but that it be placed in a separate account and invested art 
the highest rate of interest consistent with safety, with 
interest on the investment to accrue to the credit of re-
~pondent. The exact language of the minutes of the meet-
ing appellant's Board of Directors held on March 14, 1947, 
is as follows: 
"It \Vas moved by Attorney Harris that the 
~6.000.00 paid by the Metropolitan Water District of 
Provo on its Subscription Contract be not mingled 
\vith Association general funds, but that it be placed 
in a separate account and invested at the highest rate 
of interest consistent with safety; the President, Treas-
urer a..'ld l\Ir. Beesley be and are hereby authorized 
to make the investment and report their action. In-
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terest on the investment to accrue to the credit of the 
Metropolitan District. Duly seconded and passed." 
(Pl. Exh. 1, P. 3). 
As appears in the minutes above quoted, the motion 
was made by Fisher Harris, who was the general counsel 
for appellant and was also acting for respondent. Mr. 
H·arris does not remember ever having made the motion, 
but does not deny that it was made by him and that it is 
a part of the official minutes of the appellant Association. 
(T. 111). This motion sets forth the substance of the 
agerement contended for by respondent and found by the 
trial court. 
Four1Jh, on page ten, appellant admits that it raised 
no question about the entitlement of the respondent to a 
credit of the interest accruals on the investment of $6,-
000.00 until March 11, 1955, at which time Fisher Harris 
again advised the Board of Directors of appellant Associ-
ation that the accumulations belonged to the appellant, 
but .were to be applied on respondent's Subscription Con-
tract debt when the first payment on that debt became 
due. The exact language of the minutes of appellant's 
Board of Directors in that regard is as follows: 
"Mr. Harris, reporting the disposition of Provo 
City's bond and interest (held by the Association) 
said they belong to the Association as an advance pay-
ment on the Subscription Contract and that the 
amo1Dlts will have to remain in the Association's cus-
tody until the first payment is ·made on the Subscrip -
tico Contract debt. Mr. Harris moved that the in-
terest be invested in Government Bonds as fast as 
amounts sufficient to make a purchase are accumu-
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lated. Motion seconded by Mendenhall and carried." 
(Pl. Exh. 8, P. 2}. (Emphasis supplied} 
In view of the somewhat complex nature of the facts, 
respondent believes that a paraphrase thereof might be 
helpful to point up respondent's position with respect to 
this appeal. In so doing, the letter A will be used in place 
of appellant, Provo River Water Users Association, the 
letter D in place of respondent, Metropolitan Water Dis-
trict of Provo City, and the letter U, in place of the United 
States. The citations designated, "Br.", are to page num-
bers of appellant's brief. Paraphrased, then, the facts 
\Vhich we believe are material to a consideration of the 
legal issues involved in the appeal are as follows: 
Under a written agreement made in 1937, D would 
become liable to A for 8,000 shares of A's capital stock 
at some future time in an amount not to exceed $820,-
800.00. (Br. 4 & 5). The agreement provided that the 
amount which D had to pay A for the stock and the times 
of payment were dependent upon the amount and times 
A had to pay U under another contract which .A ~had with 
U, and which latter contract provided that A should PaY 
the money it would collect from D, sometime in the future, 
over to U. (Br. 4). In D's contract with A, D was obli-
gated to pay the money whenever it became due to both A 
and U, jointly. (Pl. Exh. 4, P. 13). 
\Vith that situation existing, and no payments yet 
due under the D-A contract, in November, 1946, A pro-
posed that D's maximum liability for the 8,000 shares of 
capital stock be increased from $820,800.00 to $1,231,-
200.00. (Br. 5, 6 & 8). (This figure is arrived at by adding 
together the 5912,000.00 direct liability and the $319,-
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200.00 default liability.) For reasons important to D, D 
did not want to be liable to A in excess of $1,225,200.00, 
which was $6,000.00 less than A's proposal. (Br. 6). So, 
D proposed to A that it pay to A $6,000.00 in advance so 
that its total aggregate liability would not exce€d $1,225,-
200.00, if A would agree to invest that money until it be-
came payable to U, and if A would also credit D with 
the interest it might earn until that time. (Fdg. 6 & 7, 
R-121). A's agent and attorney agrees to this, and there-
after D pays the $6,000.00 to A. (T. 42, 45, Fdg. 6 & 7, 
R-121). 
Thereupon, on February 3, 1947, the D-A stock pUT-
chase contract of 1937 was amended in writing and the 
amendment recites that the new total aggregate liability 
of D for the 8,000 shares of stock shall not exceed a total 
sum of $1,231,200.00, less $6,000.00 previously paid by D 
to A on the purchase price of said stock. (Br. 7, 8). 
The exact language of the provision in the Amenda-
tory Stock Subscription Contract of February 3, 1947, 
With respect to the increase in D's total aggregate liability 
is as follows: (Pl. Exh. 6, P 2.). 
"15. Anything herein to the contrary notwith-
standing, it is agreed that the total aggregate liability 
of the District for payment under the terms of this 
contract 
(a) To the Association for the purchase of 
the ·stock of the District in the Association shall 
not exceed the sum of $912,999.00, less $6,000.00 
previously paid by the District to the Associa-
tion on the purchase price of said stock; and 
(b) To the Association, on account of the 
default of some other stockholders in the pay-
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ment of the purchase price of the stock of such 
other stockholders in the Association shall not 
ext·(~ed the sum of $319,200.00." (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
The agreement or understanding which the trial court 
fotmd with respect to the handling by A of D's $6,000.00 
advance payment pending the time some amount actually 
became fixed, owing, and payable, was not spelled out in 
the Amendatory Contract. In any event, however, at the 
first meeting of A's Board of Directors following the sign-
ing of the Amendatory Contract, the agent and attorney 
of A, (who drafted the amendment) (T. 109, 110), made 
a motion that the $6,000.00 be not mingled with A's gen-
t'ral fund, but that it be invested at the highest rate of 
interest consistent with safety, with the interest to accrue 
thereon to the credit of D. The exact language of that 
motion appears at page 3 of this brief, and in sub-
stance sets forth the entire provisions of the agreement 
contended for by D, testified to by witness John 0. Bees-
ley, and that found by the trial court. 
For about 14 years thereafter, A carried not only the 
So,OOO.OO, but also the interest earned by the $6,000.00, 
on its books and records as a credit to D in compliance 
\\'ith the agreement contended for by D and as found by 
the trial court. In each and every year during those 14 
years. the books of A were audited by various auditing 
firms, and in every audit report the auditors .called atten-
tion to the fact that A's books showed that U. S. Govern-
metit Bonds costing $6,000.00 were purchased from the 
Proceeds of stock subscription payments made by D to A 
and that the interest received on the bonds was being 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
credited to the subscription account of D. (Br. 10). The 
auditor's reports were distributed to A's Directors in each 
year. (Fdg. 13, R-123). 
A's agent and attorney in the year 1955 again ad-
vised his Board of Directors that not only the $6,000.00 
but also the accumulated interest earned by the $6,000.00 
would have to be held by A until D's first payment '00. 
came due undeT the subscription 'contract. A's Board of 
Directors' minutes in this regard are quoted on page 4 
of this brief. 
For some Wlexplained reason, after crediting D's ac-
count with the interest accumulations for 14 years, A sud-
denly reverses itself and decides that the $6,000.00 paid 
by D 14 years previous, as what it then and for 14 yean 
thereafter recognized as an advance payment on a po-
tential liability not then due, was really paid by D uncon-
ditionally and A could do with it whatever it pleased. 
Therefore, A reasoned, the interest which had been earned 
by the $6,000.00 is the absolute property of A, notwith-
standing the previous action of its Board of Directors, and 
A has no obligation to give D any credit for the same now 
or in the future, and so appropriated it to its own use (.Br. 
10). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE AGREEMENT FOUND BY THE TRIAL 
COURT IS AMPLY SU~PPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
THE AGREEMENT FOUND BY THE TRIAL 
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COURT IS SUPPORTED BY AN ADEQUATE LEGAL 
CONSIDERATION. 
POINT ill 
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IX>ES NOT PRE-
CLUDE THE AGREEMENT FOUND BY THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S POINTS I, IV, AND V ARE ER-
RONEOUSLY PREMISED AND ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AGREEMENT FO,UND BY THE TRIAL 
COURT IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The trial court found, in substance and effect, that 
the $6,000.00 check delivered to appellant by respondent 
on or about December 2, 1946, was an advance payment 
on a potential liability of respondent to appellant. It fur-
ther found that the advance payment was made upon the 
mutual understanding of the parties that the proceeds of 
the check would be invested by appellant at the highest 
rate of interest consistent with safety, and that interest 
earned thereon, as \Vell as the $6,000.00 advance payment, 
"·ould be applied in reduction of respondent's indebted-
ness to appellant and the United States, jointly, as such 
time as an actual payable indebtedness arose. (Fdgs. 6 & 
7, R-121). 
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~be e.~ctdffiee. s.upPQirting t}lese findings is as follows: 
(1) The testimony of John 0 .. Beesley.; a director-
of both appellant and: respondent, that such was the 
understanding at the time the $6,000.00 check was 
delivered'. ( T; 34 to 67) . 
(2) The admission and ratification of appellant 
in the form of a resolution passed by its Board of Di-
recto['s at the first regular meeting of the Board after 
tn.e check was, deli've:ced, which resolutiol'l sets. forth 
the suh&~· of: the agreement conten.de.d. for by, re:-
spondent and found by the trial court. (Pl. Exh. 1, 
P. 3). 
( 3) The fact that appe1lant has carried the in-
tere.st accumulatiol)$ attributable to. the $6,000.00 in-
vested in U. &. Gov~rrunen:t BQnds_, paid to it by re-
. spondent, on its books and records as a credit to the 
su"Q~iption. ~unt of r.espon~t every· ye<N:· ftom 
1.9.47 tnr~ugp. 1960, inclusive. (Pl. Exhs.. 9· through 
19. and 22). 
(4) The fact that the books of appellant have 
been audited by vario.us.. certified public accounting 
firms. in each year 1947 through 1960, and in each 
and ev.ery. such year the reports . of the auditors called 
attention to. the-· fact that U. S. Government Bonds 
costing $6,000.00. \Ver.e purchased from the proceeds 
Qtf stock subscription payments .. made by respondent, 
a.~tl'Ct tnat. interest received on the bonds \vas being 
credited to the supscription account of respondent. 
(R-24, 112; Pl. Exhs. 9 through 19 and 20). 
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(5) The fact that such audit reports were reg-
ularly distributed ta appellant's Board of DiFeetors, 
and appellant issued no instruction& to, its audiit<YrS, 
aeeountants or bookkeepers at any time from 1947 
to l9GO,_ inclusive,. changing the method~ of handling 
the interest accumulations. (R-26, 112, T-56, 112). 
(6) Trte· fact that appellant produced no evi-
dence· and· was unable to explain why- the resolution 
C>f March 14, 1947, setting forth the exact agreement 
COllm.tlded fur by· respondent was, proposed· by· Fisher' 
Harris, (who drafted' the contract and carried the 
negotiations)-, and was passed by· appellant's· Board 
at DirK-OOPs. (T. 81, 112). 
POINT II 
THE AGREEMENT FOUND BY THE TRIAL 
CVlffiT IS SUPPORTED BY AN ADEQUATE LEGAL 
CONSIDERATION. 
The consideration. for the agreement found. by the 
trial cowt \vas the advance payment of $6,000:00 at a 
til!lS! w.hen no monies were due. Another consideration 
is respondent's entering into the Amendatory Subscrip• 
tion Contract of F2bruary 3, 1947, increHsing respondent's 
n1:edmwn total aggregate liability to appellant at a time 
\vhcn the contract of September 18, 1937, providing fo~ 
a lower aggregate liability was still in effect. Respond-
ent \Vas not legally obligated to do either, and either is 
an adequate consideration for the agreement found· hy tlie 
trial court. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
POINT m 
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE DOES NOT PRE-
CLUDE TH1E AGREEMENT FOUN!D BY THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
kppellant contends that the agreement found by the 
trial court alters, amends, or changes the tenns of the 
Amendatory Subscription Contract of February 3, 1947, 
and therefore is in violation of the parol evidence rule. 
It is respondent's position that there is no conflict at 
all between the provisions of the Amendatory Subscrip-
tion Contract or.f February 3, 1947, and the agreement 
found by the trial court. The written contract says in ef-
fect that the "tAltal aggregate liability" of the respondent 
for payment under the terms of the contract "shall not 
exceed" the sum of $1,231,200.00, less $6,000.00 previously 
paid by respondent to appellant on the purchase price of 
the stock. Respondent agrees both that the total aggre-
gate liability cannot exceed the stated amount, and agrees 
that the $6,000.00 was paid in advance on the purchase 
price of the stock to reduce the proposed maximum total 
aggregate liability by $6,000.00. Respondent does con-
tend, however, that there was a further or additional agree-
ment (the one found by the trial court), not in conflict 
with the written document, which spelled out what appel-
lant was to do with the advance payment of $6,000.00 until 
it could be applied as the parties obviously intended, and 
as required by the written contract, i. e., pay the same 
over to the United States when the United States called 
for payment under appellant's contract with the United 
States. (R-67). 
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Under the well accepted doctrine of collateral con-
tract, the parol evidence rule does not preclude parol proof 
of a prior or contemporaneous oral contract that is col-
lateral to, and not inconsistent with the written contract, 
although it relates to the same general subject matter and 
grows out of the same transaction. (20 Am. Jur. 993; 70 
..\Lit 770). 
This court held in Farr vs. Wasatch Chemical, 105 
U. 272, 143 P. 2d 281, that a lessor's oral agreement to 
make a leased warehouse tenantable could be proved by 
parol evidence, and did not alter or vary the terms of the 
written lease requiring lessee, after occupancy, to make 
repairs and alterations . In its opinion, the court quoted 
\Vigtnore on Evidence, Section 2430 as follo·ws: 
"The inquiry is whether the writing was intended 
to cover a eertain subject of negotiation; for if it was 
not. then the writing does not .embody the transaction 
on that subject ..... Whether a particular subject 
of negotiation is embodied by the writing depends 
\Vholly upon the intent of the parties thereto ..... 
This intent must be sought . . . . . in the conduct of 
the parties and the surrounding circumstances . . . . . 
The question being whether certain subjects of nego-
tiation were intended to be covered, we must com-
pare the writing and the negotiations before we can 
detennine whether they were in fact covered . . . . . 
In deciding upon this intent, the chief and most satis-
factory index for the Judge is found in the circum-
stances whether or not the particular element of the 
alleged extrinsic negotiation is dealt with at all in 
the \vriting. If it is mentioned, covered or dealt with 
in the \\Titing, then presumably the writing was meant 
to represent all of the transaction on that element; 
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if it is not, then probably the writing was not inten-
ded to embody that ele-ment of the negotiation." 
Certainly, the written Amendatocy Subscription Con-
tract of February 3, 1947, makes no mention of the in-
vestment of the advance payment of $6,000.00, and the 
crediting of interest to the respondent in addition to that 
payment. And, the motion of Fisher Harris passed by 
appellant's Board of Directors on March 14, 1947, the sub-
sequent crediting of the interest for a period of 14 years, 
the fact that the motion was made by the same person 
who drafted the written document, the fact that the writ-
ten document provided that payments were to be made 
to the appellant and to the United States jointly, and the 
fact that a payment of $6,000.00 was made at a time when 
no monies were due, also furnis,hes a sound basis for the 
conclusion apparently reached by the trial court that the 
parties did not intend to cover their oral agreement in their 
writing. See also, Utah-Idaho Sugar Company vs. State 
Tax Cc.mmission, 73 P. 2d 974, Nuttal vs. Berntson, 30 P. 
2d 738, Garrett vs. Ellison, 72 P. 2d 451. 
In Young vs. Texas Company, 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P. 
2d 1099, this court held that proof of an oral agreement 
of a lessor to seek a variance in a zoning ordinance was 
not inadmissible as varying the provisions of a written 
lease. The court stated: 
"The answer to that contention is that such an 
agreement made contemporaneously with the lease 
as to the accomplishment of the objective and any 
evidence on this subject would not vary the tenns 
of the written lease, but would rather explain it." 
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In the case at bar, it seems clear to us that the agree--
ment found by the trial court does not vary the terms of 
the written document, and not only serves to explain it, 
but also serves to explain all of the subsequent acts of ap-
pellant. including the motion of Fisher Harris of March 
1~. 1947, and the manner of appellant's bookkeeping for 
l~l years. 
Aside from the agreement found by the trial court, 
it is respondent's contention that the decree of the trial 
court may be upheld upon at least two other theories. 
First. That the $6,000.00 was paid to appellant by 
respondent at a time when no monies were due, for the 
sole purpose of discharging, pro tanto, a future indebted-
ness for appellant's capital stock, which money respond-
ent is obligated by contract to pay to the appellant and 
the United States jointly, and which money appellarit is 
obligated by contract to pay over to the United States. 
Under an elementary trust principle, where money or prop-
erty is delivered by one person to another to be held or 
paid over by the latter for a certain purpose, or generally 
for the benefit of the former or a third person, an express 
trust exists by inference. 54 Am. Jur. 70. Further, a 
trustee is al\\·ays accountable for all profits and gains aris-
ing from the trust estate. 
Second. \Vhile no case precisely in point could be 
located, it seen1s to the writer that after appellant has car-
ried the $6.000.00 as a credit to respondent on its books 
and records for 14 years, and has likewise credited the 
interest earned on that S6,000.00 to the account of the 
respondent, that it could not now reverse itself and claim 
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that the monies were improperly applied. see, 40 Am. 
Jur. 803, wherein appears the following: 
"A creditor who appropriates a payment in a par-
ticular way is bound by his act and cannot afterwards 
change the application without the consent of the 
debtor, for the law regards the rights of the parties 
as becoming fixed at the time the application is so 
lawfully made, insofar as the original debtoc and cred-
itor are concerned. Therefore, where there is no di-
rection as to the application and it is entered as a 
general credit on the general account, the creditor 
cannot make an application afterward to any specific 
part of the account to serve his interests as may be 
subsequently developed." 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S PO·INTS I, IV, AND V ARE ER-
RONEO,USLY PREMISED AND ARE WITH01UT MERIT. 
Appellant's arguments are based upon the erroneous 
premise· that the agreement found by the trial court with 
respect to the manner of crediting interest accumulations 
is in conflict with the Amendatory Stock Subscription Con-
tract of February 3, 1947, because it raises the "total ag-
gregate liability" of respondent $6,000.00 above the amount 
set fcrlh in the written contract. Such is not the case. 
Respondent agrees, admits and contends that the 
"aggregate total liability" of respondent to appellant for 
the 8,000 shares of stock under the written agreement of 
February 3, 1947, "cannot exceed" the amount stated in 
the . written contract and agrees that this provision cannot 
be varied by any oral agreement to the contrary. In other 
words, respondent agrees that the total aggregate liability 
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for stock "cannot exceed" the sum of $1,231,200.00, less 
the $6,000.00 heretofore paid. By a simple arithmetic 
calc'Ulation the maximum amount which the total aggre-
gate liability "cannot exceed" is $1,225,200.00 Likewise, 
respondent has not and does not contend that the $6,000.00 
was not paid to lower by $6,000.00 a proposed "total ag-
gregate liability" of $1,231,200.00, but on the contrary, 
respondent asserts that it was. That is not to say, how-
e-ver, that respondent now owes the sum of $1,225,200.00 
or any other amount, or at the time the $6,000.00 was 
paid, respondent owed the $6,000.00 or any other amount. 
The exact amount which respondent will owe and the times 
of payment depends entirely upon what the United States 
does in the future under its contract with appellant, and 
the amounts will not be fixed and payable until the United 
States takes some kind of action under its contract with 
appellant. As heretofore indicated, our contention is that 
at the time the $6,000.00 was paid, respondent owed a~ 
pellant nothing, does not now owe it anything, and that 
the $6,000.00 was simply an advance payment on the stock 
made by respondent pursuant to the agreement found by 
the trial court. This contention in no way conflicts with 
the written contract. w~hy, after recognizing the situation 
to be exactly as respondent contends for 14 years, appel 
lant now deterrnines otherwise, is beyond comprehension. 
The trial court found that at the time of payment 
there was a collateral oral understanding that the $6,000.00 
advance payment paid to lower a proposed ''total aggre-
gate liability " would be invested by appellant as the high-
l'St rate of interest consistent with safety until it became 
payable to appellant and the United States, and that in 
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addition to the $6,000.00 payment, respondent would also 
be given credit for the interest earned thereon. Such 
aggreement in no way conflicts with the written docu-
ment setting forth that the total aggregate liability shall 
"not exceed" $1, 225,200.00, or the recital therein of the 
$6,000.00 payment. 
Upon close analysis, appellant seems to say in points 
I, IV and V that if the oral agre€ment is enforced, respond-
ent really owes $1,231,200.00, not $1,225,200.00, and, 
therefore, the oral agreement modifies the te,rms of the 
written agreement upwards by $6,000.00. To state the 
proposition is to refute it. 
The oral agreement, confirmed by the Resolution 
passed by appellant's Board of Directors on March 13, 1947, 
has no effect whatever uporn the amount which respond-
ent will ultimately be required to pay the appellant, ex-
cept to reduce any such amount by the interest earned 
and applied. Hlow can it possibly be said, then, that this 
agreement conflicts with the written contract providing 
that respondent's ultimate "total aggregate liability" "shall 
nort exceed" $1,225,200.00, or that the proposed liability 
of $1,231,200.00 has not been reduced by the $6,000.00 
advance payment? Likewise, under what stretch of imag-
ination, can it be said that the collateral agreement raises 
respondent's total aggregate liability $6,000.00 above the 
amount stated in the written contract? 
As appellant's arguments in points I. IV and V are 
premised upon the erroneous conclusion that the collateral 
agreement raises respondent's total aggregate liability 
$6,000.00 above the maximum provided in the written 
contract, they are \Vithout merit. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
CONOLUSION 
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that appellant 
has performed no services for the $6,000.00 advance pay-
ment, and over the years, respondent has paid appellant 
for water and other services to the same extent and in 
the same fashion as all other stockholders in the appel-
lant Association. (T-116). The $6,000.00 ·has at all times 
been invested in U. S. Government Bonds, and these bonds 
along with other bonds purchased with inteTest accumu-
lations have been carried on the books and records of ap-
pellant Association in a special subscription account to the 
credit of respondent. 
Why, after recognizing for 14 years the entitlement 
of respondent to the interest earned on its advance pay-
ment of $6,000.00 on a debt, not due when paid, and not 
yet due, appellant Association suddenly decided to reverse 
itself, has never been explained. Fisher Harris's motion 
of March 14, 1947, passed by the Board of Directors of 
appellant, and the manner in which the $6,000.00 ~has 
been treated by appellant on its own books and recoros 
should be conclusive upon this controversy. The minutes 
of appellant's Board of Directors, as late as 1955 speaks 
of the bonds representing the $6,000.00 and interest ac-
cumulations as "Provo City's bond and interest". 
The trial court was convinced that respondent is en-
titled to a credit of the interest accumulations under a 
collateral agreement made many years ago, which agree-
ment was confirmed by appellant's Board of Directors 
\\ithin six weeks after it was made, and which agreement 
has been recognized and acted upon by appellant from that 
time until shortly before this law suit was brought, a pe-
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riod of more than 14 years. Respondent respectfully sub-
mits that the Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment of the 
tTial court ought to be affirmed, and that there is no fact-
ual, legal, or equitable basis for appellant's belated claims. 
• 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. Robert Bullock, of the firm of 
ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NELSO·N 
35 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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